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AND THE NEED FOR STRICT SCRUTINY OF PROBATION
CONDITIONS
Devon A. Corneal∗

INTRODUCTION
In August 2001, the Wisconsin Supreme Court touched off a
1
national debate by upholding a probation condition placed on a
2
man convicted of intentional failure to pay child support. The
probation condition prohibited David W. Oakley from fathering
children for the term of his probation unless he could prove that he
was capable of supporting the nine children he had already fathered
3
and any additional children he wanted to have. The ruling created a
conflict between child welfare concerns and the fundamental right to
∗
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1
State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). To see the breadth of coverage
the case produced, as well as the countervailing policy and legal considerations, see
Vivian Berger, Bedroom Sentence, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 17, 2001, at A21 (indicating that the
ruling “illustrates the truth of the hoary maxim that hard cases make bad law”); Joan
Biskupic, ‘Deadbeat Dad’ Told: No More Kids Wis. Court Backs Threat of Prison, USA
TODAY, July 11, 2001, at 1A (stating that the decision was “likely to reverberate across
the USA”); Dennis Chaptman, National Implications Seen in Ruling on Dad: Father of 9’s
Attorney Considering Taking Case to U.S. Supreme Court, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 12,
2001, at 2B; Glenda Cooper, Wisconsin Deadbeat Dad Case Tests the Rights to Parenthood,
WASH. POST, July 15, 2001, at A2 (characterizing the decision as “spark[ing] a
national furor”); Bruce Fein, Irresponsible Fatherhood, WASH. TIMES, August 07, 2001, at
A12; Reynolds Holding, The Judicial Sex Police; Stay Out of Our Bedrooms, S.F. CHRON.,
July 22, 2001, at D3; Tamar Lewin, Father Owing Child Support Loses Right to Procreate,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at A14; Leonard Pitts, Jr., Judge’s Ruling Raises Serious Doubts,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 18, 2001. See also Court to Deadbeat Dad: No More Kids, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,300855-412,00.shtml (July 11, 2001)
(on file with author); Jennifer Foote Sweeney, Something Cheesy in the State of
Wisconsin, at http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/07/13/wisconsin (July 13,
2001) (on file with author).
2
Wisconsin law provides that “[a]ny person who intentionally fails for 120 or
more consecutive days to provide spousal, grandchild or child support which the
person knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to provide is
guilty of a Class E felony.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.22(2) (West 2002). Although
Oakley received a five-year probation term, under Wisconsin law a conviction for a
Class E felony is punishable by “a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 5 years, or both.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3)(e) (West 2002).
3
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201.
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4

privacy and procreative control. Child welfare advocates view the
ruling as a victory for children and a mandate for child support
5
enforcement.
In contrast, civil rights advocates, dedicated to
protecting an individual’s right to control his/her own reproductive
future, view this type of probation condition as too great an
6
infringement on individual constitutional rights. Specifically, these
advocates assert that there are less intrusive/more narrowly tailored
7
means to achieve the same important goals.
This Comment examines the potential consequences of the
Oakley decision and argues that, when courts impose probation
conditions, they may not infringe upon the fundamental right to
procreate unless that infringement survives strict scrutiny. Part I of
this Comment details the foundation and development of the right to
procreate. Part II reviews the nature of probation and the difficulty
of challenging probation conditions. Part III then examines how,
and in what circumstances, probation conditions have been used to
limit procreative rights. Finally, Part IV discusses the problems
inherent in the Oakley decision and ultimately concludes that courts
must invalidate probation conditions that infringe upon the right to
procreate unless they survive strict scrutiny.

4

Cooper, supra note 1, at A2 (describing the decision as opening Pandora’s box
and comparing the viewpoints of representatives from the Association for Children
for Enforcement of Support and the Wisconsin chapter of the ACLU). The majority
and dissenting opinions in Oakley also illustrate the two positions. The majority
focused on the impact that failure to pay child support has on children, noting that
“[r]efusal to pay child support by so-called ‘deadbeat parents’ has fostered a crisis
with devastating implications for our children” and has produced troubling
consequences for children such as health and behavioral problems and lower levels
of educational achievement. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203. The dissent, however,
focused on the basic human right to have children, characterizing it as a
“fundamental liberty which the Constitution jealously guards for all Americans.” Id.
at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
5
Cooper, supra note 1, at A2 (quoting Geraldine Jensen, president of the
Association for Children for Enforcement of Support as stating, “I understand why
the court had to say no more kids until you support the ones you have. . . . These
children are living in poverty. They have a right to clothing and food. This is an
extreme case, but the poor have no excuse not to support their children. We have to
make payment of child support as serious as payment of taxes.”).
6
Id. (quoting a former chairwoman of the American Bar Association’s Family
Law Section who characterized the Oakley decision as follows: “‘It gets the state back
into the bedroom. . . . [H]ow do you keep from sliding down the slippery slope . . .
?’”).
7
Lewin, supra note 1, at A14 (quoting Julie Sternberg, a lawyer for the American
Civil Liberties Union as saying, “It’s a very dangerous precedent. The U.S. Supreme
Court has said that the right to decide to have a child is one of the most basic human
rights. And in this case there were all kinds of less restrictive alternatives.”).

2003

COMMENT

449

I. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
fundamental right to procreate for nearly sixty years. The Court took
the first step toward affording constitutional protection to the right
8
in its 1942 decision, Skinner v. Oklahoma. In Skinner, the Court
identified the right to procreate as “one of the basic civil rights of
9
man” and invalidated a state statute requiring the sterilization of
10
habitual offenders as an unconstitutional infringement on that
11
right.
The Court explained that, because “[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race,” forced sterilization of criminal offenders violates the Equal
12
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the
Court required strict scrutiny of governmental attempts to impose

8

316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Id. at 541.
10
Id. at 536 (defining habitual criminals, under Oklahoma law as, “person[s]
who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies
involving moral turpitude,’ either in an Oklahoma court or in a court of any other
State, [and] is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to
a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution”) (internal citations
omitted).
11
Id. at 537-42. This ruling was a sharp departure from the Court’s prior
jurisprudence, most notably, Buck v. Bell where the Court upheld mandatory
sterilization of the mentally handicapped in state institutions. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
In upholding the mandatory sterilization, Justice Holmes wrote his now infamous
justification, “It is better for the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.” Id. at 207. While the Supreme Court did not strike forcible
sterilization laws until 1942, some lower courts acted earlier. For example, a federal
district court judge invalidated a Nevada law allowing for the sterilization of certain
criminals in 1918. See Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2 (Ind. 1921) (striking a law
allowing sterilization of prison inmates); see also Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D.
Nev. 1918) (ruling that a Nevada law allowing forced sterilization (vasectomy) of
some criminals violated the State constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment). But see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 162-63 (1993) (discussing later Indiana laws allowing sterilization
of the “feebleminded”).
12
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. Although the Court ruled on Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection grounds, because the law impermissibly discriminated against
criminals, commentators still trace the recognition of reproductive control as a
fundamental right to this decision. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 657-58 (1997) (indicating that Skinner, by departing
from the Courts’ previous jurisprudence as established in Buck v. Bell, was the first
case to recognize the right to procreate); Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition: One
Step Forward or Two Steps Back?, 16 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 139, 148 (1993)
(characterizing Skinner as the “springboard” for case law supporting the right to
procreate).
9
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involuntary sterilization.
In 1965, the Court gave further protection to the right to control
14
one’s reproductive choices in Griswold v. Connecticut.
Griswold
established the fundamental right to privacy for married couples and
stands as the first of a series of contraceptive cases that built upon
15
Skinner to firmly establish procreation as a fundamental right. In
Griswold, the Court invalidated a state law that prohibited dispensing
information, instruction, or medical advice about contraception to

13

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating that “strict scrutiny of the classification which a
State makes in a sterilization law is essential”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at
658.
Courts review legislative enactments with strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
or rational basis review. Id. at 529. Strict scrutiny is the least deferential, most
exacting review a court applies and requires that the government have compelling
goals achieved through narrowly tailored means. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155-56 (1973) (finding that infringements on the fundamental right to privacy will
only be upheld if the State can demonstrate that the infringement is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest). Legislative enactments that infringe
upon a fundamental right or discriminate against a protected class of persons trigger
strict scrutiny. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 529.
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government have important goals
achieved by a substantially related regulation. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute that prohibited sale of a type of beer to
males under twenty-one and females under eighteen because the statute was not
substantially related to an important governmental interest). But see Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (defining intermediate scrutiny as
requiring the government to have an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for laws
discriminating on the basis of gender) as an instance in which the Court may actually
be applying a slightly higher level of scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court has
limited the use of intermediate scrutiny to the Equal Protection context.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 529-30.
Rational basis review is the most deferential, least exacting scrutiny the Court
applies and requires only that the government’s goals are legitimate and that the
means chosen are rationally related to those goals. See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of
Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977) (applying rational basis where
the “statute does not involve any discernible fundamental interest or affect with
particularity any protected class”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314
(1976) (noting that rational basis scrutiny is “a relatively relaxed standard reflecting
the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a
legislative task”). Rational basis review is the default level of review applied where
strict or intermediate scrutiny is inappropriate. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 533.
14
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 658-62. Additionally, Griswold has been
called the “decision that inaugurated the Court’s modern protection of fundamental
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” David B. Cruz,
“The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence and the Constitution, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 299 (2000) (identifying Griswold as the “foundation for a
series of Supreme Court decisions invalidating anti-contraception and anti-abortion
laws—cases once referred to by Richard Posner as ‘the sexual freedom cases’”)
(internal citation omitted).
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16

married persons. Justice Douglas’s majority opinion relied on the
Bill of Rights and “emanations from those guarantees” to recognize
17
zones of privacy that protect the intimate relationship between
18
husband, wife, and doctor. By recognizing zones of privacy through
“penumbras” surrounding explicit fundamental rights, the Court
determined that privacy itself is a fundamental right, even though it is
19
not express in the text of the Constitution.
While Griswold only protected a married couple’s privacy, six
years later the Court expanded the privacy right to individuals in
20
Eisenstadt v. Baird. The Court noted that, for privacy to have any
21
meaning, it must extend to individuals. Writing for the majority,
Justice Brennan stated that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
22
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Thus, by
invalidating a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of

16

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (citing a Connecticut law that prohibited persons
from using “any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception,” and allowed for the prosecution of any person who “assists, abets,
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense”). In Griswold,
the defendants were the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut and its medical director who gave married persons contraceptive
information and materials. Id. at 480.
17
Id. at 484. Justice Douglas’s opinion noted that this right of privacy was “older
than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties . . . . Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully unending, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred.” Id. at 486 (emphasis added). Justice Goldberg’s concurrence echoed this
position, stating that “[t]he entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy
and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the
fundamental rights specifically protected.” Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
18
Id. at 481-82.
19
Id. at 484; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 659. Justices Black and
Stewart dissented in Griswold, vigorously asserting that because the right to privacy
was not express in the text of the Constitution, it was not fundamental. Griswold, 381
U.S. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black pointedly noted, “I get nowhere in
this case by talk about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as an emanation from one or
more constitutional provisions. I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am
nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.” Id. at 509-10 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stewart went so far as to state, “I think this is an uncommonly
silly law,” while still maintaining that it should be upheld because the Constitution
did not enumerate privacy as an explicit right. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
21
Id. at 440 (overturning a defendant’s conviction under a law banning
distribution of contraceptives).
22
Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
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23

contraceptives to single persons, Eisenstadt not only expanded
privacy rights to individuals, but also anchored procreative control
24
within that right.
The final case establishing the fundamental right to procreate is
25
Carey v. Population Services International, Inc.
In Carey, the Court
followed the reasoning of Eisenstadt and expanded the right to
26
contraceptive access and information to minors. The Court stated,
“[t]he decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very
heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices [regarding
27
family and procreative autonomy/control].” Carey also cemented
the underpinnings of Griswold and Eisenstadt, ensuring, as one
commentator has written, that Griswold could “no longer be read as
holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple’s use of
contraceptives,” rather, “[r]ead in light of its progeny, the teaching of
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in
28
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.”
The Court also made it clear that State intrusions are only justified if
29
they survive strict scrutiny.
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion
stated that, “where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear
or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may
be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly
30
drawn to express only those interests.”
Cases addressing the legality of, and access to, abortion have
further addressed the protection afforded an individual’s decision
whether or not to become a parent. In 1973, the Court’s ruling in
31
Roe v. Wade established a woman’s right to choose to terminate her
32
pregnancy. In Roe, the Court invalidated a Texas law prohibiting all

23

The Massachusetts law made it illegal to “sell[], lend[], give[] away, exhibit[]
or offer[] to sell, lend or give away an instrument or other article intended to be
used . . . for the prevention of conception” but allowed physicians to “administer or
prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of
pregnancy or conception.” Id. at 442.
24
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 661.
25
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
26
Id. at 682; see also Cruz, supra note 15, at 300.
27
Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 661.
28
Cruz, supra note 15, at 310; see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 687 (noting that postGriswold decisions make it clear that “the constitutional protection of individual
autonomy in matters of childbearing” is not based on protecting only the marital
relationship).
29
Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
30
Id. at 686 (internal citations omitted).
31
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32
Id.
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abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother.
Interestingly, the Court no longer found privacy in the penumbras of
the Bill of Rights as it had earlier in Griswold, but rather found privacy
34
protection in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated that,
although the Constitution does not expressly mention the right to
privacy, such a right has been, and will continue to be, recognized by
the Court as fundamental and “implicit in the concept of ordered
35
liberty.” The Roe court found that the privacy right is rooted in the
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and includes not only an individual’s right
to use contraceptives, but also a woman’s right to terminate a
36
pregnancy.
While Roe affirmed that the right to privacy includes personal
reproductive freedom and control, the decision also explicated that
37
the right is not absolute. Narrowly tailored infringements designed
38
to achieve compelling state interests are permissible. At least one
commentator has argued that allowing state infringement on the
39
right to privacy indicates that the right is not secure. This view,
however, overstates the case when considered in the wake of the
entire universe of cases following Roe.
Although the Court has never defined privacy as an absolute
40
right, the Court further secured the right to procreate in its 1992

33

Id. at 164.
Id. at 153.
35
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
36
Id. at 152, 154; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 664.
37
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
38
Id. at 155-56 (stating that where fundamental rights are implicated, regulation
is justified only “by a compelling state interest, and that legislative enactments must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake”) (internal
citations omitted).
39
Ballard, supra note 12, at 149-50 (arguing that, in practice, the right to privacy
is often constrained by an “expanding definition of what constitutes a compelling
state interest” and that the “occasional evaluation of reproductive rights-burdening
regulations under a mere rationality standard of review” prevents the right from
finding “stable footing in our constitutional framework”). In fact, Ballard suggests
that there is, in effect, “no substantially established and judicially recognized
constellation of constitutional rights supportive of the option to have children and to
control the conditions under which one procreates.” Id. Ballard further argues that
it is this very impermanence and instability that has allowed courts to impose
Norplant probation conditions on female probationers, conditions that she views as
invalid infringements upon procreative rights because although temporary, Norplant
(or Depo-Provera) is still medical sterilization. Id.
40
See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (stating that the privacy interest is not absolute,
and “that at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical
standards, and prenatal life, become dominant”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326
34
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41

decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The six-three decision in Casey
affirmed the central holding of Roe. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for
the majority stated that “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all,
42
not to mandate our own moral code.” The Court further noted that
at the core of liberty and, therefore, reproductive freedom, is the
right of an individual to define his/her “own concept of existence, of
43
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” While
later limits on Roe raise questions regarding the breadth of the right
44
to privacy as it extends to procreative control, the mere existence of
limits on a fundamental right does not mean that the right is in
danger of being extinguished. No right is absolute; for example, the
courts have imposed limits on freedom of speech and yet, the core of
45
the right remains. Abortion rights are a unique and particularly
contentious issue in today’s society, yet the Court’s consistent
protection of the right to procreate more generally highlights the
46
right’s stability and importance in constitutional jurisprudence.
II. PROBATION
Probation is a means by which the criminal justice system can
impose “supervised, conditional freedom” instead of incarceration on
47
convicted criminals.
Specifically, probation requires that
48
probationers comply with conditions that may limit their freedom. If
those conditions are violated, a court may revoke an offender’s
49
probation and send him/her to prison. How the United States has

(1980) (holding the federal government is not required to fund abortions even when
medically necessary); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (ruling that under Roe,
states can refuse to provide Medicaid funds for non-medically necessary abortions
even when the state provides Medicaid funding for childbirth).
41
505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
(invalidating a Nebraska law banning partial-birth abortions that did not provide a
maternal health exception because Casey required that such an exception be
included).
42
Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
43
Id. at 851.
44
See supra note 40.
45
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Communication Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622,
641-43 (1994) (discussing application of strict and intermediate scrutiny to
regulations of speech); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961)
(rejecting the position that freedom of speech under the First Amendment is
“absolute”).
46
See supra PART I.
47
NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 1:2, at 1-7 (2d ed. 1999).
48
Id. § 1:1, at 1-3.
49
Id. § 1:1, at 1-3, 1-4 (noting that revocation can only occur by holding a
“judicial revocation proceeding”).
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implemented its probation system and how this process interacts with
fundamental rights is as much a study of social policy as it is of the
law.
A. Origin of Probation in the United States
Surprisingly, the American probationary system began, not with
50
a legislative enactment, but with the actions of a cobbler. Probation
in the United States first started when John Augustus convinced the
Boston Police Court to release a drunk to his custody rather than to
51
jail him. In his lifetime, Augustus arranged the bail of nearly 2,000
defendants, and earned the titles of “inventor” and “father” of
52
probation.
Augustus’s ad hoc system ended in 1878 when
Massachusetts passed the first probation statute; other states and the
53
federal government followed suit. Today, probation statutes affect
54
millions of individuals.
B. Goals of Probation
The theoretical underpinnings of probation and its goals have
changed over time. Probation initially developed as a way to avoid
55
the harsh sentences at common law.
The severity of criminal

50

ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND
PROBATION 67 (2d ed. 1997). The development of this informal system of probation
is even more surprising given the hostility towards Augustus’ work from police and
court personnel who were only paid if defendants were incarcerated. Id.
51
See id. at 68, 71. The author notes Augustus’ position as a temperance worker
who conditioned the defendants’ release on their willingness to take a sobriety
pledge; if the defendants followed Augustus’ conditions, the cases against them were
dismissed. Id.
52
Id; see also COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:2, at 1-8.
53
See COHEN, supra note 47, at § 1:2, at 1-8, 1-9 (noting that the first federal
probation statute, Law of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259, was passed in 1925).
Today the Federal Sentencing Guidelines govern probation on the federal level. Id.
at 1-10; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 162-63.
54
See COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:2, at 1-8; see also KLEIN, supra note 50, at 68-69
(noting that by 1984, 63% of offenders were placed on probation, while 26% were
incarcerated and 11% were on parole, and further indicating that probation
caseloads rose 154% from 1980 to 1993). For examples of these statutes, see 18
U.S.C. § 3563 (2002). See also infra note 70. The most recent data from the Bureau
of Justice Statistics indicates that on Dec. 31, 2000 there were 3,839,532 persons on
probation (nearly three times the number of persons in prison) and that
probationers are predominately men (78%). United States Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Correctional Population Reaches New High: Grows By
126,400 During 2000 to Total 6.5 Million Adults, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/ppus00.pdf (last visited June 25, 2002) (on file with author).
55
See KLEIN, supra note 50, at 71.
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punishment, influenced by religious and moral determinations,
engendered criticism in the mid-eighteenth century, and by the
middle of the nineteenth century public attention and resources
57
finally turned to ameliorating criminal sanctions.
Probation
mitigated the severity of sentences and incorporated rehabilitation
58
into criminal law.
Bolstered by the belief of many commentators that incarceration
59
failed to rehabilitate, that prisons were overcrowded, and that
probation was less expensive than imprisonment, the focus on
probation as a means of rehabilitation continued through the
60
1960’s. Faith in probation as a means of rehabilitation began to
decline in the 1970’s, however, when society began to view probation
61
as a public threat. As society became more fearful of crime and
what appeared to be increasingly more violent criminals, the
62
rationale for rehabilitation lost some of its appeal. This shift in
56

See COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:2, at 1-7.
Id. § 1:2, at 1-7, 1-8.
58
Id § 1:2, at 1-10; see also United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928)
(noting that the 1925 Federal Probation Act stated that its purpose was to provide
“an amelioration of the sentence by delaying actual execution or providing a
suspension so that the stigma might be withheld and an opportunity for reform and
repentance granted before actual imprisonment should stain the life of the
convict”); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975)
(noting that, in five amendments to the Act [through 1972], the rehabilitative goal
of probation had never been rejected, and, in fact, the amendments seemed to
emphasize the “rehabilitative theme”).
59
See GEORGE G. KILLINGER & PAUL F. CROMWELL, CORRECTIONS IN THE
COMMUNITY: ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT 168 (1974).
60
See Phaedra Athena O’Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis
of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions,
77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 841 (1999); see also KILLINGER & CROMWELL, supra note 59, at 45;
KLEIN, supra note 50, at 71; James C. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern
Probation Conditions, 8 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 367, 368-69 (1982) (asserting that
probation “functions as the prototypical alternative to incarceration for non-violent,
repetitive conduct”); Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlett Letter: A Critical
Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1368-70 (1989) (noting
that probation is primarily rehabilitative).
61
See KLEIN, supra note 50, at 71-72; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 404
(stating that “ [i]n retrospect, the 1950’s and 1960’s represented a peak or high
point in the movement to make criminal justice more humane, and to tilt the
balance away from the police and prosecution. A backlash or reaction then set it. A
wave of conservatism swept over the country. It had its roots in the great fear: the
fear and hatred of crime.”).
62
See COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:1, at 1-2 (characterizing politicians as being
“enamored with the retribution and vengeance aspects of criminal law while
simultaneously becoming less enchanted with the rehabilitation aspect of
penology”). Cohen also notes that critics of the rehabilitative model argue that
probation and parole have failed to rehabilitate as an empirical matter. Id. § 1:23, at
1-33, 1-34.
57
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thinking prompted some states and the federal government to treat
probation not as an alternative to sentencing, but as a sentence in
63
and of itself.
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Standards for Criminal
64
Justice, (“Standards”) illustrates this shift. In 1970, the Standards
stated that the goal of probation was to “avoid[] future crimes by
helping the defendant learn to live productively in the community
65
which he has offended against.” The Standards further stated that
this goal was best achieved by “orient[ing] the criminal sanction
toward the community setting in those cases where it is compatible
66
with the other objectives of sentencing.”
In 1994, however, the
revised Standards defined “compliance programs” (including
probation) as sanctions designed to “promote offenders’ future
compliance with the law,” thus, rejecting the use of the term
“probation” in order to move away from the traditional definition of
67
This shift also emphasized the “long-standing ABA
probation.
policy that the legislature should authorize sentences to probation as
68
a free-standing sanction.” The revision of the Standards indicates
the ABA’s view that probation is a stand-alone sanction and that
69
rehabilitation is no longer the main goal of probation.

63

See Kelly, supra note 60, at 844-45; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2002) (defining
probation as a sentence and explicating when a convicted offender “may be
sentenced to a term of probation”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4302 (2001); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:43-2(b) (West 2001); Fonville v. McLaughlin, 270 A.2d 529, 530 (Del.
1970) (stating that “the imposition of a term of probation constitutes a sentence”).
64
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing §18-3.13, Commentary (3d ed.
1994) [hereinafter Standards for Criminal Justice].
65
ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Probation 1
(Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter Approved Draft].
66
Id.
67
Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 65.
68
Id.
69
See Approved Draft, supra note 65, § 1.2, at 27 (stating that probation is desirable
in certain cases because:
(i)
it maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the same time
vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting the
public from further violations of law;
(ii)
it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by
continuing normal community contracts;
(iii)
it avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement
which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of
the offender into the community;
(iv)
it greatly reduces the financial costs to the public treasury of an
effective correctional system;
(v)
it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon the innocent
dependents of the offender).
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Notwithstanding the ABA’s position, however, many states
70
continue to “conceptualize probation as fostering rehabilitation.”
What constitutes rehabilitation in the face of social desires to “get
tough on crime,” however, is less clear. One commentator has
described the current political climate as ushering in “[a]n era of
71
more creative, experimental probation conditions” including the
harsh and punitive measures of “chemical therapy for sex offenders,
72
forced birth control, and . . . castration.” The question today is
whether such experimentation is constitutionally permissible in the
73
area of the fundamental right to procreate.

70

COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:5, at 1-11 (pointing to the importance of
maintaining ties to the community and family in order to avoid the “corrupting
influence” of prison).
Despite the move away from viewing rehabilitation as the primary goal of
probation, many states still retain that goal in their statutory language. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-303(a) (Michie 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4301 (2001); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 907.6 (West 2001); LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895 (West 2001);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1204-2-m (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-6(F)
(Michie 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2951.02(C)(1)(a) (Anderson 2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754(c)(13) (West
2002); see also KLEIN, supra note 50, at 72-73 (positing that the continued faith in
probation as rehabilitation stems from a belief that the administration of the system
is problematic, not probation itself, noting that, in 1988, probation received only
three cents to every dollar spent on corrections); Kelly, supra note 60, at 843 (noting
that “because of a lack of funding and support staff, probation as a method of
rehabilitation has not been nearly as effective” as hoped).
71
Kelly, supra note 60, at 784. This characterization of probation conditions
taking on an “experimental” quality raises questions as to whether state
experimentation with probation conditions is permissible when the conditions
implicate fundamental rights.
Id.
Justice Goldberg provided an insightful
perspective on this issue in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly
underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the right to marital
privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and
magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.
....
. . . “[A] . . . State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments, I do not believe that this includes the
power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens . . . .”
The vice of the dissenters’ views is that it would permit such
experimentation by the States in the area of the fundamental personal
rights of its citizens. I cannot agree that the Constitution grants such
power either to the States or to the Federal Government.
381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965) (internal citations omitted).
72
Kelly, supra note 60, at 784.
73
COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:22, at 1-32 (noting that recent concerns about the
developments in the underlying theoretical foundation of probation are driven not
only by reduced confidence in rehabilitation, but also by skepticism regarding the
“vast discretion accorded those people who implement it”). Cohen raises additional
concerns that the system itself is one “where arbitrariness and capriciousness are
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C. Probation Statutes
Probationary goals, whether punitive or remedial, are entirely
74
statutory.
Overall, the structure of state and federal probation
75
statutes is remarkably similar. These statutes impose restrictions on
76
the freedom of an individual who has been convicted of a crime.
These statutory restrictions, commonly called “conditions,” generally
77
take one of three forms.
The first type of statute gives the
sentencing court great latitude to impose appropriate restrictions by
offering few specific suggestions of probation conditions and grants
78
the court nearly unlimited discretion. The second type requires the
sentencing court to apply certain mandatory conditions but then
confers upon the court the power to impose other necessary and
79
appropriate conditions.
The third type, and the clear trend in
probation, lists detailed, specific conditions that the court may (but is
not required to) impose and also grants courts the authority to
impose other reasonable conditions, usually through a “catch-all”
80
provision.
Mandatory or suggested conditions often include restrictions
such as a prohibition against re-offending during the probationary
term, remaining within the jurisdiction, and reporting to probation
81
officers.
Violation of any of these conditions results in the
possible and very difficult to detect.” Id.§ 1:24, at 1-34.
74
See COHEN, supra note 47, § 2:1, at 2-3; see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S.
27, 37 (1916) (noting there is no constitutional right to probation); United States v.
Mele, 117 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1997) (identifying the power to grant probation as solely
rooted in statutes); United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating
that there is no constitutional right to probation).
75
See Klein, supra note 50, at 77-80 (discussing the similarity of statutes across
jurisdictions and giving examples of the structure and provisions of those statutes).
76
COHEN, supra note 47, § 7:13, at 7-22.
77
Id.
78
Id. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 1A (West 2002) (allowing the
court to “place [an offender] on probation for such time and on such terms and
conditions as it shall fix”).
79
Id. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S § 3563 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
80
COHEN, supra note 47, § 7:12, at 7-23. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (West
2002).
81
KLEIN, supra note 50, at 77-78. Klein characterizes the common statutory
conditions as follows:
First, probationers must obey all laws. Second, they must report
periodically to their probation officer. Third, they must obey all court
orders, including payment of court-ordered fines, costs, fees,
restitution, support and other financial assessments. Fourth, they must
remain within the jurisdiction of the court. Fifth, they must participate
in and often pay for proscribed treatment.
Id. The author additionally notes that other conditions are increasingly being
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82

termination of probation and the incarceration of the offender.
83
This “laundry list” of conditions may then be supplemented by
84
discretionary “special conditions” imposed in light of the particular
85
Indeed, legislatures have granted judges such
facts of a case.
extraordinary discretion to impose appropriate conditions that one
commentator has noted that special conditions are “limited only by
86
the sentencing judge’s imagination.” These special conditions have
87
ranged from so-called “scarlet letter provisions” which require overt
actions by the probationer to inform the public that s/he has been
88
convicted of a crime to less overt restrictions such as making
89
donations to specific organizations, refraining from associating with

included as mandatory provisions, such as community service, jail terms as a
condition of probation, searches or testing, or prohibitions from owning firearms.
Id. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 3563(a) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
82
COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:2, at 1-7.
83
Brilliant, supra note 60, at 1367.
84
KLEIN, supra note 50, at 80-88 (noting that a sentencing judge’s discretion,
while not total, is very broad and will be given discretion by appellate courts). See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 3563(b) (Law. Co-op. 2002) (giving courts the ability to impose
discretionary conditions by explicating twenty-one optional conditions including
restitution, support of dependents, required employment, medical or psychological
treatment, and also including a catch-all category through which the courts may
require a defendant to “satisfy such other conditions as the court may impose”).
85
COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:10, at 1-16.
86
Kelly McMurry, For Shame: Paying for Crime Without Serving Time, But with a Dose
of Humility, TRIAL, May 1997, at 12.
87
United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912-15 (8th Cir. 1982)
(noting disapproval of “scarlet letter” terms of probation). See generally Kelly, supra
note 60 (analyzing the validity of such conditions and recommending improvements
on current approaches); Brilliant, supra note 60 (providing a broad analysis and
critique of scarlet-letter probation conditions).
88
See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(requiring a convicted felon to wear a t-shirt with “My record plus two six-packs
equals four years” printed on the front and, “I am on felony probation for theft”
printed on the back); People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (overruled on other grounds by People v. Welch, 851 P.2d 802, 808 (Cal.
1993)) (forcing petitioner, a convicted purse snatcher, to wear tap shoes when
leaving his house); Lindsey v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(requiring probationer to take out an ad in a newspaper which had his mug shot and
the caption “DUI—Convicted”); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993) (forcing man to wear a pink fluorescent bracelet with “DUI Convict” on it);
People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ill. 1997) (imposing the condition that a man
convicted of aggravated battery place signs at all entrances to his farm which stated
“Warning! A Violent Felon lives here. Enter at your own risk!”); People v.
Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. 1995) (striking down a probation condition
requiring a convicted DWI offender to place a fluorescent bumper sticker stating
“Convicted DWI” on his car); State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316 (Or. Ct. App.
1989) (en banc) (forcing a man convicted of sexual abuse to put a sign at his home
and on his car for 5 years that read “Dangerous Sex Offender”).
89
See, e.g., William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 912-915 (allowing a corporate
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certain persons/groups, or from engaging in certain activities.
Restrictions preventing probationers from engaging in certain
activities have led to challenges in the area of reproductive rights;
specifically, individuals have challenged conditions that prohibit
them from conceiving and bearing children during their
probationary terms as violative of the fundamental right to
92
procreate.
D. Challenges to Probation Conditions
1. Obstacles to Challenges of Probation Conditions

Although there have been numerous critiques of probation
conditions, challenges to these restrictions have been largely
93
unsuccessful. Courts rely on various theories to reject probation
challenges, including (1) the “act of grace doctrine” and (2) the
94
contract, or waiver, doctrine. The United States Supreme Court first
95
articulated the act of grace doctrine in Escoe v. Zerbst. In Escoe, the
Court stated, “probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of
grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such
96
conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose.”
Thus, probation was viewed as a privilege that could be taken away at
the discretion of the trial court and that should be accepted

defendant to pay a fine to a charitable organization where corporate officers were
doing community service); People v. Burleigh, 727 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. Ct. App.
1986) (requiring probationer to make charitable contribution to a drug treatment
program); State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273, 1274 (Conn. 1997) (forcing probationer to
make a donation to a local hospital).
90
See, e.g., United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574-76 (7th Cir. 1991)
(prohibiting probationer from associating with skinhead or neo-Nazi organizations);
United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (prohibiting
probationer from association with “known homosexuals”).
91
See, e.g., People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(prohibiting a female offender from living with “any man to whom [she was] not
married” and from becoming pregnant until after she was married).
92
See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
93
COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:10, at 1-16. Of perhaps equal importance, however,
is that few conditions are ever challenged. See Horwitz, infra note 99, at 81-84.
94
Kelly, supra note 60, at 839-40 (identifying act of grace and contract theories as
the “[t]raditional justifications for not allowing probationers to challenge their
probation conditions”); see also COHEN, supra note 47, § 7:1, at 7-3; Jeffrey N. Hurwitz,
House Arrest: A Critical Analysis of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
771, 791-92 (1987).
95
295 U.S. 490 (1934). Two years earlier, in Burns v. United States, the Court
alluded to its understanding of probation as a beneficent grant when it characterized
probation as a privilege, not a right. 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
96
Escoe, 295 U.S. at 492-93.
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97

thankfully by the probationer.
In 1973, however, the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the act of grace doctrine in Gagnon v.
98
Scarpelli, finding that “a probationer can no longer be denied due
process, in reliance on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, that probation is
99
an ‘act of grace.’” As one commentator has noted, “probationers do
in fact have constitutionally protected rights that can neither be
bartered away to the state for greater lenience in sentencing nor
100
compromised in accordance with a restrictive act of grace theory.”
Courts have also used the contract (or waiver) doctrine to reject
challenges to probation conditions. The contract doctrine views
probation as a contract between the probationer and the court in
which the probationer agrees to abide by specific conditions and the
court agrees not to incarcerate the probationer so long as the
101
conditions are followed.
Under this doctrine, the probationer is
deemed to have waived any right to challenge the bargain into which
s/he entered; however, in 1932, the Supreme Court expressly stated

97

See Kelly, supra note 60, at 840; see also People v. Osslo, 323 P.2d 397 (Cal. 1958)
(finding that there is no constitutional right to rehabilitation so there is no right to
be put on probation rather than to be incarcerated). At least one court has also
indicated that the act of grace doctrine subsumes a constructive custody theory which
“suggests that since the convicted criminal might have been sentenced to prison
instead of being placed on probation . . . [s/he] may be considered as living in a
‘prison without walls,’ subject to the same restrictions . . . as any other prisoner. Any
departure from these restrictions should be viewed as a matter of grace, not one of
right.” Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 273-74.
98
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
99
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 n.4. For additional decisions eroding the doctrine, see
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1971) (granting Fourteenth Amendment
protections to the liberty interests of parolees); Mempa v. Ray, 389 U.S. 128, 136
(1967) (granting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel where sentencing occurs
after a probation revocation); United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir.
1976) (granting procedural protections to an attorney convicted of filing a false tax
return). For commentary discussing the theoretical problems inherent in relying on
the act of grace doctrine, see Ballard, supra note 12, at 184 (noting the doctrine’s
rejection by the judiciary); Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial
Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 75, 88-90 (2000) (noting that the doctrine is highly criticized by scholars,
yet recognizing that it is still used to deny review to probation challenges). Some
commentators have suggested that the view of probation as a privilege has fueled the
courts’ reluctance to hear Eighth Amendment challenges to special probation
conditions. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 60, at 839.
100
Hurwitz, supra note 94, at 792; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. at 225
(1985) (characterizing the act of grace theory as “out of date and unrealistic,”
arguing that probation is not imposed as a matter of grace but rather because both
“common sense” and research indicate “that it is better to maintain the offender in
the environment in which he must eventually learn to live” rather than to incarcerate
him).
101
See Kelly, supra note 60, at 839.
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that probation is not a contract and probationers “cannot insist on
102
terms or strike a bargain.” Additionally, critics have noted that the
“significant pressure” exerted by the threat of incarceration
undermines the voluntary nature of a convict’s acceptance of the
103
conditions.
Although the Supreme Court has expressly rejected, and
commentators have sharply criticized both the act of grace and the
contract/waiver doctrines, both doctrines still retain some
104
105
influence.
Recent decisions continue to rely on both doctrines.
106
For example, a 1998 Indiana decision, Morgan v. State, characterized

102

Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (adopting instead the act of
grace doctrine to uphold a probation condition); see also Roberts v. United States,
320 U.S. 264, 274 (1943) (stating that probation is not “a kind of bargain”)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1970)
(“Probation is in fact not a contract. The probationer does not enter into agreement
on an equal status with the state.”); United States v. Birnbaum, 402 F.2d 24, 29 (2d
Cir. 1968) (stating that probation is not a contract); Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at
265 n.15 (explaining that the Supreme Court had rejected contract theory in the
parole context in Morrissey v. Brewer, therefore, the Ninth Circuit believed “that the
custody and contract theories are equally inappropriate when applied in the
probation setting”) (internal citation omitted); Kelly, supra note 60, at 840; Bruce D.
Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When Reasonableness is Not
Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 59 (1981); Note, Judicial Review of Probation
Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 188-90 (1967) [hereinafter Judicial Review] (noting
that “[i]t requires no sophisticated analysis to demonstrate that the acceptance of
probation by the offender bears little resemblance to a contract” given that neither
“release from custody” nor the offenders agreement to the conditions are “mutually
bargained for,” and additionally noting that the form of “offer” and acceptance is
merely a formality used “primarily for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
offender intends to abide by the condition” in order to avoid “the necessity of a later
revocation proceeding” if the offender intends not to comply); Sunny A.M. Koshy,
Note, The Right of the People to be Secure: Extending Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights
to Probationers and Parolees, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 449, 466-67 (1988) (noting that wavier of
one’s rights is only valid when “made voluntarily and in the ‘totality of the
circumstances’” and that the threat of incarceration undermines the “voluntariness”
of agreement to probation conditions) (internal citation omitted).
103
Greenberg, supra note 102, at 57.
104
Kelly, supra note 60, at 838.
105
See, e.g., State v. Donovan, 568 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (noting
that “probation is a matter of legislative grace”) (internal citation omitted); People v.
Welch, 851 P.2d 802, 810 (Cal. 1993) (adopting the waiver theory to reject a
probation challenge); People v. Bacon, 587 N.E.2d 606, 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(stating that “a sentence of probation is a matter of judicial grace”); State v. Macy,
403 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1987) (rejecting defendant’s probation challenge because
he “chose probation but now challenges what he voluntarily accepted”); State v.
Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d 163, 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (describing probation as an
“act of grace”); State v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 822, 824 (W. Va. 1996) (defining
probation as a “matter of grace”).
106
691 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
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the imposition of probation as a “matter of grace.” Commentators
also have noted the continued use of both doctrines, observing that
“though the act of grace doctrine is ‘thoroughly discredited,’ courts
108
continue ritualistically to mouth it,” and that regardless of whether
the acceptance of probation conditions actually constitutes a valid
109
contract, courts still refer to probation as such. The continued use
of both highly criticized doctrines is troubling and will be discussed
later in this Comment in light of the recent decision in Oakley.
2. Tests Applied to Review Probation Conditions
Despite these philosophical obstacles, courts still hear challenges
to probation conditions and must apply some test to review those
conditions. The myriad of tests applied is nothing short of a “chaotic
110
hodgepodge.”
In the broadest sense, the tests for review of
conditions fall into two categories: (1) relatively deferential tests
which evaluate the reasonableness of the condition (generally
111
applied to statutory challenges), and (2) tests involving some
heightened level of scrutiny when a condition implicates a
112
constitutional right (also called “unconstitutional conditions” tests).
This Comment will look briefly at each approach in turn and then
suggest that courts must review probation conditions implicating the
fundamental right to procreate with strict scrutiny.
a. Reasonableness Tests
Courts applying a review based on reasonableness examine
probation conditions to “ensure that [they] further[] the implicit or
explicit statutory goals of probation” and that those conditions fall
within those that could be used generally as a sanction against
113
criminal defendants.
This review may be applied not only to
conditions that do not implicate constitutional rights, but also to
114
Courts adopting this type of review have further
those that do.
refined it by formulating two alternative/separate subtests: (1)
107

Id. at 468.
See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 102, at 56.
109
See, e.g., Comment, Rights of the Maryland Probationer: A Primer for the Probationer,
11 U. BALT. L. REV. 272, 274 n.14 (1982).
110
Kelly, supra note 60, at 838.
111
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 90.
112
Id.
113
Brilliant, supra note 60, at 1373; see also Horwitz, supra note 99, at 90 (noting
that these challenges seem to engender less confusion and more consensus
regarding the appropriate standard of review than do constitutional challenges).
114
See infra note 127.
108
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reasonableness, and (2) reasonable relation.
A reasonableness test is the most deferential review, as it requires
only that conditions be reasonable; the convicted criminal must be
116
able to follow them and they cannot be excessive, vague, or illegal.
Appellate courts applying this approach generally review conditions
under a very deferential “abuse of discretion” standard, which in turn
means that appellate courts very rarely invalidate challenged
117
conditions.
A reasonable relation standard entails the only slightly more
exacting requirement that conditions be reasonably related to the
118
This test produces wide-ranging
underlying goals of probation.
results because the underlying goals of probation vary from state to
119
state.
Reasonable relation is the level of review adopted by the
120
Two California state court
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
121
122
decisions, People v. Dominguez and People v. Lent, articulate a well-

115

Kelly, supra note 60, at 846-61.
Id. at 847. See, e.g., Pastore, 537 F.2d at 683 (invalidating a probation condition
prohibiting an attorney from practicing law as “improper”); Sweeney v. United
States, 353 F.2d 10, 11 (7th Cir. 1965) (invalidating as unreasonable a probation
condition prohibiting an alcoholic from drinking); State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410,
411 (S.C. 1985) (invalidating a probation condition requiring castration of
defendant as illegal); State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 744 (S.D. 1987) (characterizing
the test as “one of reasonableness”); State v. Barklind, 532 P.2d 633, 637 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1975) (applying reasonableness test to determine the “propriety of a condition
of probation”); Williams v. State, 523 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)
(invalidating a probation condition as “vague and indefinite” where defendant was
prohibited from “‘reenter[ing] without written permission from this Court.’”);
People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95 (Mich. 1930) (invalidating a condition of probation
requiring defendant to leave the state for the five year term of probation because it
contravened public policy by encouraging states to dump convicted criminals into
other states).
117
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 90-91; see also id. at 78 (observing that the “general
rule appears to be that if the appellate court cannot categorically describe the
probation condition as irrational, the condition survives”); COHEN, supra note 47, §
7:32, at 7-58 (stating that “most probation and parole conditions are upheld”).
118
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 92-93.
119
Id. (observing that although the “majority of states” view rehabilitation as the
primary goal of probation, courts have required that the condition be related to
additional goals such as public safety, deterrence, retribution and future criminality).
120
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(b) (2001). The overarching
purpose of the guidelines is to “prescribe appropriate sentences for offenders
convicted of federal crimes,” and included in the guidelines are provisions for
probation. Id. at Introduction. See, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 876 F.2d 272, 274 (2d
Cir. 1989) (stating that under the federal probation regime, probation conditions
need only be “reasonably related to the simultaneous goals of rehabilitating the
defendant and protecting the public”) (internal citations omitted).
121
64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal Ct. App. 1967).
122
541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. 1975).
116
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known reasonable relation test. The test developed in these two cases
123
Under the
is commonly known as the Dominguez-Lent test.
Dominguez-Lent test, a probation condition is invalid if it “(1) has no
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2)
relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or
forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
124
criminality.”
This test has been widely adopted, leading
commentators to characterize California as being “at the forefront of
125
developing standards for analyzing probation conditions.”
One
commentator has astutely noted, however, that the ultimate result of
reasonableness or reasonable relation tests is an “extraordinarily
126
deferential” review.
b. Unconstitutional Condition Tests
While many courts apply a reasonableness or reasonable relation
127
test to any and all probation conditions, some courts adopt a more

123

See Kelly, supra note 60, at 848.
Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (invalidating a probation condition, which
prohibited a convicted robber from becoming pregnant unless she was married, as
unrelated to robbery and further noting that “[c]ontraceptive failure is not an
idicium of criminality”). For cases outside of the California Court of Appeals
applying the Dominguez standard, see Lent, 541 P.2d at 548; Rodriguez v. State, 378
So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 n.2
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
125
See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 60, at n.545 (noting that Dominguez shows California’s
leading position at the state level in probation condition analysis, while ConsueloGonzales shows its leadership at the federal level).
126
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 94-95 (noting, however, that the review does have
“enough teeth in it to enable a court to overturn a condition that it finds offensive or
troubling”).
127
See, e.g., Schiff, 876 F.2d at 274 (stating that under the federal probation
regime, probation conditions need only be “‘reasonably related to the simultaneous
goals of rehabilitating the defendant and protecting the public’”) (internal citations
omitted); Brumley v. Simmons, No. 97-3161-DES, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8160, at *9
(D. Kan. May 26, 2000) (finding that “[p]robation conditions which restrict
constitutional rights such as the right of association . . . must bear a reasonable
relationship to the rehabilitation of the accused and the protection of the public”);
Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 959-60 (Mass. 1998) (noting that courts
have great flexibility in crafting probation conditions and that conditions that restrict
constitutional rights must only be “‘reasonably related’ to the goals of sentencing
and probation”); State v. Bolt, 984 P.2d 1181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
probation conditions limiting the probationer’s freedom of association where the
conditions were “not punitive and are reasonably related to the purposes of
probation”); State v. Schertz, No. 99-1516-CR, 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1392, at *15-16
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1999) (noting the broad ability of sentencing courts to
impose reasonable conditions and allowing that “conditions may impinge on
constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related
to the defendant’s rehabilitation”).
124
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searching review where conditions implicate constitutional rights.
As mentioned above, prior adherence to the act of grace and contract
theories has limited the ability of probationers to challenge their
129
conditions as unconstitutional.
However, some courts are more
receptive to constitutional challenges now that these two doctrines
130
have been discredited.
131
the Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,
articulated a heightened scrutiny for probation conditions that
implicate constitutional rights.
In Consuelo-Gonzalez, the court
indicated that while it would uphold probation conditions that
infringed upon fundamental rights, it would only do so if that
132
condition survived “special scrutiny.” This special scrutiny consisted
of a three-part review examining “the purposes sought to be served by
probation, the extent to which the full constitutional guarantees
available to those not under probation should be accorded
133
probationers, and the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”
The
134
Ninth Circuit later clarified the test in Higdon v. United States. The
Higdon court explained that this “special scrutiny” consisted of a twostep test: first, the court must examine the purpose for the imposition
of the condition and second, provided the purpose is permissible, the
court must “determine whether the conditions are reasonably related
135
to that purpose.”
This reformulation appears to render this
136
“special scrutiny” as little more than a reasonableness analysis,
128

See Kelly, supra note 60, at 849; see also infra notes 130-36 and accompanying

text.
129

Brilliant, supra note 60, at 1376; see also Development in Law: Alternatives to
Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1950 (1988) [hereinafter Alternatives to
Incarceration] (noting that reliance on the “act of grace” and contract doctrines had
limited constitutional challenges to probation conditions such that “[o]ffenders have
enjoyed greater success when arguing that their probation conditions are not
reasonably related to the purposes of probation”).
130
See Brilliant, supra note 60 at 1376; see also United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d
1205 (4th Cir. 1978) (upholding a Fourth Amendment challenge to the use of
evidence obtained by a warrantless search of probationer’s home in a probation
revocation hearing); Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971) (upholding a
First Amendment challenge to a probation condition prohibiting defendant from
speaking about and questioning the constitutionality of tax laws).
131
521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
132
Id. at 265. The court also categorically rejected the position that the
contract/waiver doctrine would be an acceptable reason to side-step this review. Id.
133
Id. at 262.
134
627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Kelly, supra note 60, at 849.
135
Higdon, 627 F.2d at 897.
136
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 99-101 (commenting that even when courts claim to
apply some heightened review, the scrutiny afforded probation conditions is rarely
more than a “variant on the ‘reasonableness’ test”).
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particularly given the deference that appellate courts adopting this
137
test have continued to show sentencing courts. Commentators have
also criticized the test for providing little guidance for appellate
courts, particularly regarding the extent to which probationers are
138
afforded constitutional rights.
c. Choosing the Appropriate Standard of Review
Having two separate levels of review for probation conditions
gives appropriate deference to the courts to impose suitable
conditions to achieve probationary goals. Where conditions do not
implicate constitutional rights, appellate courts defer to the
139
sentencing court’s determination of reasonable restrictions.
In
contrast, when conditions infringe upon a fundamental right such as
those that prohibit a probationer from conceiving or bearing
children for the term of his/her probation, courts should apply a
140
heightened scrutiny.
However, a review of probation conditions
that implicate fundamental rights must be more exacting than a
141
Review of constitutional
reasonableness test with a new label.
challenges to probation conditions must prevent inappropriate
encroachment on fundamental rights, particularly where those
infringements are based on “pop-psychology, personal values and
142
morality and various degrees of bias and prejudice.”
Without a
stringent and coherent level of scrutiny for constitutionally-based
probation challenges, the criminal justice system allows trial courts
nearly unbridled discretion to limit all fundamental rights, including
143
not only privacy and procreative rights, but also freedom of speech,
144
145
freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
137

See, e.g., Owens v. Kelly, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Smith, 540 A.2d 679, 689 (Conn.
1988); Patton v. State, 580 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); see also Horwitz,
supra note 99, at 102.
138
See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 99, at 102.
139
Id. at 90-91.
140
Id. at 157.
141
Id. at 110.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 110-13 (citing People v. King, 73 Cal. Rptr. 440, 448 (Cal Ct. App. 1968)
(upholding a condition that precluded probationer from, among other things,
“making speeches” in anti-war demonstrations)).
144
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 118-24 (noting that the courts have “trampled upon
and virtually disregarded the right of a defendant to freedom of association perhaps
more than any other cherished constitutional right” and that appellate courts are
“particularly deferential” in this area).
145
Id. at 132-36; see also Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1974)
(upholding a condition prohibiting probationer from participating in “any Irish
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To this end, courts should apply strict scrutiny to probation
146
To do otherwise
conditions that implicate fundamental rights.
would run contrary to an extensive history of Supreme Court rulings
that require strict scrutiny for state abridgement of fundamental
147
liberties.
As Justice Goldberg wrote in his concurring opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut,
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where
fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be
abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a
proper state purpose. “Where there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling.” The law must be
shown “necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the
148
accomplishment of a permissible state policy.”

While Justice Goldberg was addressing regulation of contraceptives
and not criminal sanctions such as probation, the same high level of
scrutiny should be afforded probationers. The Supreme Court has
given constitutional protection to the right to procreate for nearly
sixty years and strict scrutiny appropriately protects this fundamental
right while still affording courts discretion to craft and impose
probation conditions.
Additionally, strict scrutiny provides a
coherent and consistent test for all courts to apply and minimizes
149
discrepancies between courts.
Courts have already applied strict
scrutiny to strike down criminal sentences imposing permanent
150
sterilization or castration on offenders; probationers should receive
Catholic organizations or groups”).
146
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 157-58.
147
Infringement upon a fundamental right or discrimination against a protected
group triggers strict scrutiny, which requires that a statute be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest. See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting, for the first time, a higher level of scrutiny for
laws that infringe on fundamental rights or discriminate against certain groups).
Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (emphasizing the need
for judicial deference to legislative decisions by applying rational basis review even
when the Court might view the law as “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought”), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973)
(finding that fundamental privacy rights include the right to terminate pregnancy,
yet infringement on that right may be upheld if the infringement is narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest).
148
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted).
149
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 157-58.
150
See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (invalidating the
Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which required forced sterilization
after a third felony conviction involving “moral turpitude,” as an invalid
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similar protection for their procreative rights.
III. INFRINGEMENTS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE
Trial judges have vast discretion to impose probation conditions,
so much so that judges have intruded on probationers’ fundamental
151
right to privacy with “alarming frequency.”
Conditions preventing
probationers from having children have taken a variety of forms
including permanent sterilization, forced birth control, and general
152
prohibitions against having children.
While rulings imposing
permanent/surgical sterilization or castration as part of a criminal
sentence or probation have consistently been struck down as
153
unconstitutional, sentencing judges have recently begun to require
that probationers use reversible methods of birth control such as
154
Norplant or Depo-Provera while on probation. Commentators have
argued that forced birth control imposes a reversible “sterilization”
procedure that is as much an unconstitutional infringement on the
155
right to procreate as permanent sterilization. These commentators
assert that the temporal character of the infringement is not the
relevant consideration, rather the ultimate abridgement of the right
156
is the important point. Additionally, because the fundamental right
to procreate survives incarceration and may be infringed upon only

infringement on the basic civil rights of marriage and procreation); Mickle v.
Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 690-92 (Dist. Ct. Nev. 1918) (invalidating a state constitutional
provision requiring vasectomies of certain criminals as cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment); State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 410-11
(S.C. 1985) (invalidating the imposition of a probation condition requiring
castration as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); see also
Kristyn M. Walker, Judicial Control of Reproductive Freedom: The Use of Norplant as a
Condition of Probation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 779, 787 (1993) (noting that “no appellate
court has sustained an order forcing contraception or sterilization as a condition of
probation”). An early California case, which upheld a probation condition requiring
the vasectomy of a probationer as reasonable, People v. Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352
(Cal. 1936), was later questioned in Dominguez, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94. In
Dominguez, the court noted that Blankenship was a “most extreme case” based on “
dubious” authority and, therefore, struck a probation condition requiring
sterilization of the probationer. Id.
151
Horwitz, supra note 100, at 136.
152
Id. at 137-38.
153
See supra note 148.
154
See, e.g., People v. Walsh, 593 N.W.2d 558, 558 (Mich. 1999) (stating that,
although the court did not reach the issue, a probation condition requiring a
convicted child abuser to use Depo-Provera or Norplant during her probation was an
invalid and unlawful restriction) (Corrigan, J., concurring).
155
Ballard, supra note 12, at 149-50; see also Walker, supra note 150, at 787.
156
Ballard, supra note 12, at 149-50.
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to the extent necessary to achieve valid penological goals,
probationers, who suffer a less serious infringement on their liberty,
should be afforded at least as much protection as incarcerated
158
criminals.
Alternatively, some courts have imposed probation conditions
that preclude a woman from becoming pregnant while on probation
159
without requiring the use of any specific contraceptive method.
Although supporters of these conditions argue that pregnancy
prohibitions are necessary to protect children from drug-related birth
160
defects and child abuse, opponents correctly note that these

157

See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 94-96 (1987) (striking down a prison
regulation prohibiting prisoners from marrying without the prison superintendant’s
permission; noting that, although the right to marry may be subject to restrictions
resulting from imprisonment, “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison
inmates from the protections of the Constitution” and, therefore, a restriction
implicating constitutional rights would be upheld only “if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984)
(stating that prisoners must be “accorded those rights not fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of
incarceration”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (reiterating that “a
prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system”); see also Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that
prisoners retain their right to procreate even though incarcerated); Hernandez v.
Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that both the right to marry and the
right to procreate survive incarceration, even though those rights may be restricted
during incarceration); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990)
(noting that constitutional rights survive incarceration and may be restricted only
where necessary to serve valid penological goals).
158
See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 12, at 166-67.
159
See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(invalidating as overbroad a probation condition requiring that a woman not
become pregnant for the term of her probation, which was five years); People v.
Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (invaliding as overbroad a probation
condition for a woman not to become pregnant because less restrictive alternatives
were available); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(establishing a reasonableness test for probation conditions and invalidating a
condition requiring that a convicted robber not become pregnant); Rodriguez v.
State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (invalidating a ten-year probation
condition prohibiting a woman from becoming pregnant); State v. Mosburg, 768
P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (invalidating a probation condition prohibiting a
female offender from becoming pregnant as unreasonable and an abuse of
discretion); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (invalidating a
probation condition that precluded a convicted forger from becoming pregnant
unless she was married because the condition was not reasonably related to the
prevention of future criminality); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1976) (invalidating a probation condition prohibiting a woman from becoming
pregnant for five years because it was too great an infringement on her fundamental
right to procreate).
160
See, e.g., Janet W. Steverson, Stopping Fetal Abuse with No-Pregnancy and Drug
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conditions are infringements of the greatest magnitude on personal
privacy and reproductive freedoms and are often imposed on the
basis of a trial judge’s own prejudices or personal values rather than
161
on the basis of rehabilitation.
Like forced sterilization, these
162
conditions have consistently been invalidated.
Interestingly, but
not surprisingly, nearly all of the past rulings and critiques have
focused on women’s rights and women’s probation conditions. The
latest wrinkle in the debate has been the imposition of similar
163
conditions on men.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH OAKLEY
David W. Oakley is not a model citizen. By the time he was
164
convicted of felony failure to pay child support, he had fathered
nine children between the ages of three and sixteen with four
different women and was $25,000 in arrears on his child support
165
payments. The trial court was convinced that he had intentionally
failed to make his payments in the past and that he had no intention
166
of making his payments in the future. At sentencing, the trial judge
imposed a probation condition prohibiting Oakley from fathering

Treatment Probation Conditions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 295, 346-47 (1994) (noting,
however, that a no-pregnancy condition alone is insufficient to achieve these goals
and proposing that the court must also require birth control either in the form of
Norplant or a contraceptive of the probationer’s choice).
161
See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 12, at 139-141; see also Horwitz, supra note 99, at
138.
162
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 139-42. Horwitz also notes that while courts have
invalidated probation conditions, which restrict the fundamental right to procreate,
the structural barriers inherent in appealing these conditions suggest that the rates
at which these conditions are imposed, yet unchallenged, is high. Id.
163
See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1992) (invalidating a
probation condition prohibiting a man from fathering more children until he could
prove that he could provide for his current children because it was not reasonably
related to the drug offense for which he was convicted and less restrictive alternatives
existed); Howland v. Florida, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (vacating a
probation condition that prohibited a father convicted of child abuse from fathering
more children while on probation); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). It
is not that the protection of the right to procreate differs based on gender, but
rather, that these conditions (or challenges) are relatively new and they implicate
issues of privacy and practical enforcement. See infra notes 198-207.
164
Oakley was a repeat offender; he had previously been convicted of witness
intimidation. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202.
165
Id.
166
Justice Wilcox’s opinion for the majority quotes the sentencing judge, Judge
Hazlewood, as noting, “If Mr. Oakley had paid something, had made an earnest
effort to pay anything within his remote ability to pay, we wouldn’t be sitting here,”
and further quotes Judge Hazlewood as characterizing Oakley’s arrears as “obvious,
consistent and inexcusable.” Id. at 202-03.
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children during his five-year probationary term unless he could prove
that he was capable of supporting his nine children and any
167
additional children.
Oakley’s neglect of his parental
responsibilities raises serious questions regarding his children’s needs
and the pressures placed on the women raising them. However, as
critics of the majority’s opinion have noted, “hard cases make bad
168
law,” and a determination that Oakley failed to pay child support
does not automatically lead to the conclusion that he should lose his
constitutional right to have children. State v. Oakley provides an
example not only of the difficulties probationers face in challenging
the terms of their probation, but also of the need for strict scrutiny
review of probation conditions that implicate fundamental rights.
First, the Oakley decision appears to rely on the discredited “act
169
of grace” doctrine.
Justice Wilcox’s majority opinion stated that
“because Oakley was convicted of [a felony, he] could have been
imprisoned for six years, which would have eliminated his right to
procreate altogether . . . [therefore], this probation condition, which
infringes on his right to procreate during his term of probation, is
170
not invalid under these facts.” While the court avoided using words
such as “act of grace” or “privilege,” the underlying message is clear—
171
Oakley’s probation was a gift.
As discussed previously, the act of
grace doctrine has been repudiated as a means of rejecting
172
challenges to probation restrictions.
Oakley has a constitutionally
protected right to procreate and the court should not have dismissed
Oakley’s challenge to his probation condition so quickly or easily.
Not only is Justice Wilcox’s statement troubling in its reliance on
173
the act of grace doctrine, it is also inaccurate.
Had Oakley been
incarcerated, he would not have entirely lost his right to procreate;
his right would have been limited only to the extent necessary to
174
meet valid penological goals.
Noting this inaccuracy, the dissent
stated, “[Oakley] is a probationer and has retained a degree of his
liberty, including ‘a significant degree of privacy under the Fourth,

167

Id. at 203.
Berger, supra note 1, at A21.
169
Supra notes 93-100, 104-09 and accompanying text.
170
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02.
171
Id.
172
Judicial Review, supra note 102, at 202 (noting that the “assumptions upon
which the act of grace theory rests have been shown to be unsound and the doctrine
can no longer serve to immunize probation conditions from constitutional
controls”).
173
See supra note 157.
174
Id.
168
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Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.’ While the State has chosen not
to exercise control over Oakley’s body by incarcerating him, it does
not necessarily follow that the State may then opt to exercise
175
unlimited control over his right to procreate.”
Because the
functions of probation, protecting society and rehabilitating
offenders, require some restrictions on offenders, probationers
cannot expect to retain the same freedoms and rights as individuals
176
not convicted of crimes. However, to state that Oakley would have
lost his right to procreate completely is an untenable position in light
of the jurisprudence established by the United States Supreme Court
177
regarding prisoners’ rights.
Second, courts should review this type of probation restriction
with strict scrutiny and such a review demands that the condition be
invalidated. The need for strict scrutiny is clear: not only does such a
review protect individual rights, but it also helps to remove from the
criminal justice system the “personal biases, stereotypes and
prejudices” that individual judges may include in their decision
178
making. Strict scrutiny review requires judges to impose conditions
that have been narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
governmental objectives of rehabilitating offenders while protecting
179
public safety.
Under this rubric, Oakley’s probation condition is
unconstitutional. There is no doubt that the right to procreate is
180
fundamental.
It is also clear that the probation condition
prohibiting Oakley from fathering children for the term of his
probation infringes upon that right. Strict scrutiny requires that the
state’s imposition of the condition be narrowly tailored to achieve
181
compelling goals.
There is no dispute that the state has a compelling interest in
182
the instant case.
Indeed, Justice Bradley’s dissent echoed the
majority’s position that there is a compelling state interest in
requiring parents to support their children not only to provide for
the individual child’s needs, but also to prevent greater societal

175

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
See Judicial Review, supra note 102, at 202.
177
See supra note 157.
178
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 162.
179
Id.
180
See supra notes 8-39 and accompanying text.
181
See supra note 13.
182
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216, 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (stating that “[t]he state, of course, has a duty of the
highest order to protect the interests of minor children, particularly those of tender
years”).
176

2003

COMMENT

475

problems such as poverty, poor educational attainment, and poor
183
Justice Bradley’s dissent
health among the nation’s children.
clearly explicates, however, that the state had other means at its
disposal, more narrowly tailored and available by statute to better
184
ensure the payment of support to Oakley’s children.
The court
could have required that Oakley remain employed, that he hold two
jobs, that his wages be assigned, that his tax refunds be intercepted,
that liens be taken on his property, that he be found in civil
contempt, or that he be prosecuted for “any additional intentional
185
failures to support his children, present or future.” Justice Bradley
appropriately placed the burden on the state to show that when it
acts to infringe upon a liberty interest it does so with the least
186
intrusive means possible.
Although the court may have been
concerned that Oakley would not be swayed by these options, the
dissent correctly noted that that inference is insufficient to impose an
187
overly broad infringement on his right to procreate.
Ultimately,
the condition clearly fails to survive strict scrutiny.
Additionally, by failing to apply strict scrutiny and upholding the
probation condition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court became the first
court in the United States to “declare constitutional a condition that
limits a probationer’s right to procreate based on his financial ability
to support his children,” and wrote a decision that may “affect the
188
rights of every citizen of this state, man or woman, rich or poor.”
189
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zablocki v. Redhail suggests that
190
In Zablocki, the
such a condition is indeed unconstitutional.
Supreme Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute that prohibited
individuals from marrying until they had proven that they had met
191
their child support obligations.
Although the right to marry and
the right to procreate are not the same, Justice Bradley argued in
dissent that they are closely aligned, an argument that is consistent

183

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting that under Wisconsin law, the court
could have chosen to garnish Oakley’s wages, place a lien on his personal property or
hold him in civil contempt if he chose not to honor his obligations).
185
Id. at 222 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
186
Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312
(1980); Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972)).
187
Id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (stating that “[s]uch an inference does not a
constitutional justification make”).
188
Id. at 216.
189
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
190
Id. at 388-91.
191
Id.
184

476

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:447

192

with prior Supreme Court cases. Justice Bradley expressed concern
regarding a “judicially-imposed ‘credit check’” on the right to bear
193
children, and characterized the majority’s decision as “imbue[ing]
194
a fundamental liberty interest with a sliding scale of wealth.” Justice
Bradley noted further that “[m]en and women in America are free to
have children, as many as they desire. They may do so without the
means to support the children and may later suffer legal
consequences as a result of that inability to provide support.
However, the right to have a child has never been rationed on the
195
basis of wealth.”
Third, even under a less-exacting reasonableness or reasonable
relation review, it is unclear that prohibiting Oakley from having
more children will aid his rehabilitation or protect the public.
Oakley’s crime is felony failure to pay child support—his probation
condition does nothing to ensure that he supports his current
children. Preventing Oakley from having additional children does
196
not compel him to provide for his present children.
If anything,
the condition is likely to make it more difficult for Oakley to support
his children because if he fathers another child (a circumstance that
could arise even if he uses birth control in his future sexual
197
encounters), he will be incarcerated.
Finally, the Oakley decision illustrates the complex policy
considerations surrounding appellate review of probation conditions
and underscores the need for more exacting review of probation
198
conditions when they are challenged. While the bulk of challenges
199
to probation conditions have come from women, the imposition of
similar conditions on male probationers does not change the analysis
regarding the unconstitutionality of infringement on procreative
rights—rather, this case highlights the new practical hurdles and
192

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at
374; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating that “[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”).
193
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
194
Id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
195
Id.(Bradley, J., dissenting).
196
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02.
197
This possibility was noted by the trial judge as a factor in his decision to impose
probation instead of incarceration; Judge Hazelwood noted that “if Mr. Oakley goes
to prison, he’s not going to be in a position to pay any meaningful support for these
children.” Id. at 203.
198
Horwitz, supra note 99, at 81-85, 154 (noting that challenges to probation
conditions are not common and, therefore, many unconstitutional conditions may
go unchecked).
199
Id. at 136-41; see also supra note 155.
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policy concerns raised when these restrictions are placed on men.
This probation condition cannot be enforced. There is no means to
prevent Oakley from engaging in sexual intercourse and certainly no
200
means to ensure that he does so responsibly. One must ask how a
court can monitor the restriction prohibiting a male probationer
from fathering children—unlike female probationers, who can be
given pregnancy tests by their probation officers, there is no similar
test for men. Additionally, there is no Norplant or Depo-Provera
201
birth control equivalent for men. Further, the probation condition
202
will not be violated until a woman gives birth to a child, so arguably
Oakley could follow all the terms of his probation until 8 months
before the end of his term and then father numerous children who
will not be born until after the term expires. This allows Oakley to
stay within the letter of this probation condition even as he violates its
spirit. In fact, in 1992, the Eight Circuit noted these problems when
it found a similar probation condition unworkable:
Short of having a probation officer follow [the probationer]
twenty-four hours a day, there is no way to prevent [him] from
fathering more children. If [he] were to violate this condition of
his probation, he may well be returned to prison, leaving him no
way to provide for his dependents. This certainly would not serve
the district court’s goal of “adequately support[ing] and
203
sustain[ing]” [the probationers] children.

By deferring to the trial court and applying a minimal reasonableness
analysis to Oakley’s probation condition, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court failed to give appropriate weight to these difficulties and
allowed far too great an imposition on Oakley’s fundamental right to
procreate.
A final policy concern is that imposing probation conditions
prohibiting fathering or giving birth to children may be “coercive of
204
abortion.”
While past cases have raised this concern regarding
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Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
But see People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating
a probation condition for a male sex-offender requiring that he receive DepoProvera injections).
202
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
203
United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992).
204
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Pointer,
199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) in which the court invalidated a
probation condition prohibiting a female probationer from conceiving and raising
fears that if she became pregnant while on probation, she might seek an abortion to
avoid going to prison); see also State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989).
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female probationers, the fear of coerced abortion looms just as
large where conditions are placed on men. If a male probationer
impregnates a woman and realizes that having done so he will be sent
to prison, his incentive is high to demand that that woman terminate
206
her pregnancy. It also places the woman in a terrible bind: she can
choose to have an abortion or see the father of her child go to prison.
In the latter case, the woman is then forced to raise and support the
child on her own and grapple with any psychological repercussions
207
should she feel responsible for the defendant’s incarceration. Such
collateral consequences of probation restrictions again highlight the
need for narrowly tailored restrictions designed to rehabilitate
offenders and to protect the public.
CONCLUSION
State v. Oakley presents the stark difficulties inherent in balancing
individual freedoms with state needs, specifically the tug-of-war
between individual reproductive rights and the rights of children to
be financially supported by both of their parents. Yet, simply because
countervailing considerations make arriving at the correct decision
difficult, courts cannot abdicate their responsibility to protect
constitutional rights.
Appellate courts must review probation
conditions that infringe upon constitutional rights with strict scrutiny
both to protect individual rights and to curb the inclusion of
prejudice, bias, and personal values in probation restrictions. Strict
scrutiny allows trial judges to be creative while precluding the
imposition of overly harsh punitive probation restrictions. Although
these restrictions may satisfy a simplistic notion of getting tough on
crime, they fail to protect probationers’ constitutional rights and also
fail to further the rehabilitative goals of probation. Appellate review
provides a check upon trial courts only when that review is truly
substantive and not simply a rubber stamp; it is time for appellate
courts to begin reigning in the immense discretion of trial courts and
insist that probation conditions infringing upon the fundamental
right to procreate survive strict scrutiny.
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See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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